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Injected Gas: Realty or Personalty?
INTRODUCTION
The judicial system has historically encountered difficulty
when attempting to classify the nature of a property interest in
oil and gas. Common law looked to analogies to describe own-
ership rights and eventually adopted the ferae naturae doctrine
because of the migratory characteristics associated with these
minerals. I The mineral ferae naturae theory states that there is
no ownership in oil and gas until they are reduced to possession.2
Oil and gas are utilized by consumers after they are pumped
out of their natural reservoir, transported through pipelines, and
then injected into storage facilities near the location where they
will be used. Once taken from their natural reservoir, oil and
gas are legally classified as personalty.3 While the minerals are
being transported through the pipeline they continue to be per-
sonalty. 4 Upon injection of the minerals into a storage reservoir,
the authorities are split as to the nature of ownership.
Until recently, Kentucky law was unclear as to whether in-
jected gas is realty or personalty for purposes of perfecting a
security interest. In Texas American Energy Corp. v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,' the Kentucky Supreme Court ad-
dressed this question and held that injected gas is personalty and
governed by the filing requirements of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 6 This Comment addresses whether hydrocarbons injected
I The ferae naturae doctrine is also referred to as the wild animal theory. See
generally 4 AM. JuR. 2D Animals §§ 14-19 (1962).
2 R. HEMNGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.3 (1971).
1 W. THORNTON & S. WILLIS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 50 (1st ed. 5th
printing 1932).
' Crystal Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Marion Gas Co., 74 N.E. 14 (Ind. Ct. App.
1905).
736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
6 Id.
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into a storage reservoir with confinement integritY7 should be
classified as realty or personalty for purposes of perfecting a
security interest.
I. TExAs AMiERICAN
Texas American8 involved a declaratory judgment action 9
concerning whether a security interest in injected gas is personal
property governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code 10 or an interest in real estate containing only a right to
extract and secured only by the filing of a real estate mortgage.
The Texas American Energy Corporation, owner of the Western
Kentucky Gas Company [hereinafter Western], had a revolving
loan agreement with the Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Com-
pany." Citizens Fidelity provided funds for the purchase of
native gas extracted from Texas and Louisiana. 2 After extrac-
tion, the gas was transported through pipelines to Western's
distribution system in Kentucky. The gas was then purchased
during the summer months, stored in underground gas reser-
voirs, and retrieved during the winter months when consumer
demand was high. '
4
Texas American contended that injected gas was personal
property which could be encumbered merely by filing a financing
statement pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
I Confinement integrity is the ability of a reservoir to prevent leakage into adjacent
subterranean areas. In Texas American, confinement integrity was stipulated because of
the "cushion gas" method that was used to maintain the integrity of the reservoir. Also,
a Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals Regulation requires 2,000 foot buffer
zones around a storage field, and this permit process was followed. 805 Ky. ADMIN.
REG. 1:080 (1987). Because of this stipulation, confinement integrity was not at issue in
the case.
1 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
9 Ky. REv. STAT. § 418.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill) [herinafter KRS with all cites
being to Michie/Bobbs-Merrill].
KRS § 355.9-102(l)(a) (1960).
Texas American, 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
1 Id.
13 Id.
" Western had six storage fields. These storage fields are natural underground
reservoirs, which are surrounded by various types of sandstone formations that are
capable of accepting and containing natural gas because the surrounding strata is
impervious to the migratory characteristics of natural gas. These reservoirs once con-
tained "native gas" which was depleted. Id. at 26.
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Code. 5 Citizens Fidelity asserted that under Kentucky law, the
injected gas was an interest in real estate which could be encum-
bered by merely filing a real estate mortgage.1
6
Granting discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that natural gas stored in underground reservoirs with con-
finement integrity remains personalty for purposes of perfecting
a security interest.17 Upon injection, the gas does not revert back
to mineral ferae naturae, and thus does not become subject to
the surface owner's interest in the real estate overlying the un-
derground reservoirs. 8 In regard to injected gas, the Texas
American court specifically overruled all contrary precedent in-
cluding the landmark case of Hammonds v. Central Kentucky
Gas Co. 19 which had originally set forth the mineral ferae na-
turae doctrine.
II. THE HAMMONDS CASE
Under common law, only water and wild animals were con-
ceived to have fugacious characteristics, which are generally
defined as tendencies to migrate. 20 The ferae naturae theory, a
possessory concept, was first applied to wild animals. 2' Title to
wild animals is gained only by taking them into possession;
however, ownership is lost upon escape of the animal. 22
Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Gas Co. 23 is the most sig-
nificant Kentucky case to apply the ferae naturae theory to
ownership of oil and gas in underground storage areas. 24 Mrs.
Hammonds owned a fee simple estate within the boundary of
the gas company's 15,000 acre storage field. She argued that the
,1 Id. at 25-26.
16 Id. at 26.
17 Texas American, 736 S.W.2d at 28.
I Id.
9 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934).
2 See generally R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF On. AND GAS § 1.3 (1971). But cf.
Early courts looked to wild animal and water analogies; however, these analogies are
improper because water and oil operate within closed systems, but wild animals operate
within open systems.
23 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals §§ 14-19 (1962).
' Id.
2 75 S.W.2d 204 (1934).
2. Id.
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storage of injected gas in an underground storage reservoir which
extended into her estate was a trespass. 25 The Hammonds court
held that the gas company lost ownership rights when it injected
the gas into the underground reservoir. 26 Since there was no
ownership, there could be no trespass. The court's rationale was
that injection of the gas into an underground storage facility,
which subsequently developed a leak, resulted in a loss of do-
minion or control over the gas. 27 The court analogized this loss
of control over the gas to the lack of control one has over a
wild animal. 28 This analogy wrought the mineral ferae naturae
doctrine. 29 However, the Hammonds court ultimately held that
the gas company's lack of control resulted in a loss of ownership
of the gas.30
Scholars have soundly criticized the Hammond opinion be-
cause: (1) injected gas differs substantially from gas in its native
state;3 (2) the opinion is based on archaic notions of the prop-
erties of subterranean strata;3 2 and (3) to prove lost title to
personal property, which oil and gas become upon extraction, it
is usually necessary to show an intent to abandon. Scientific
advances in the oil and gas area, however, have revealed the
most profound flaw in the mineral ferae naturae rule. As the
ability to measure, transport, and confine gas and oil increased,
various courts began to acknowledge the inconsistency between
the theory and the injected gas process.
III. THE SMALLWOOD DECISIONS
After Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,3
Kentucky courts rendered two significant opinions interpreting
the Hammonds holding. The first case was Central Kentucky
23 Id. at 205-06.
'Id.
7 d. at 205.
2s Id.
29 Hammonds, 75 S.W.2d at 205-06.
30 Id.
11 Smith, Rights and Liabilities on Subsurface Operations, Southwestern Legal
Foundation, Eighth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 1, at 25-26
(1980-81).
32 Id.
31 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934).
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Natural Gas Co. v. Smallwood34 [hereinafter Smallwood I] which
involved a lease for the production and storage of gas." Intially,
the landowner in Smallwood I had conveyed all of the surface
rights and one-half of the mineral rights, reserving half to him-
self.36 The grantee subsequently executed an oil and gas produc-
tion and storage lease.17 The lessee provided that the lessor/
grantee's rentals would be proportional to his title to the oil and
gas. 38 Thereafter, the lessee used the property only for the stor-
age of injected gas. 39 A dispute arose when the lessee paid the
lessor only half of the rentals, based on the lessor's one-half
interest in the mineral rights.4 The lessor claimed he was entitled
to all the rentals because he owned all of the surface rights.4'
Traditionally the surface owner has the right to explore for and
produce gas.4 2 The lessor argued this right to explore and pro-
duce included both stored and native gas, since there was no
legal distinction as to ownership between the two types of gas.
43
The Smallwood court recognized that there was no legal distinc-
tion between injected and native gas. 44 However, the court re-
jected the lessor's argument, holding that the right to rentals
under a lease for the storage and production of gas belonged
exclusively to the mineral estate owner, not the owner of the
surface estate. 45 Therefore, the lessor was entitled to only one-
14 252 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1952).
11 Id. at 866. "The lease conferred ... for the right of drilling . . . for and storing
[of] gas of any kind regardless of the source thereof, including the right of injecting gas
in the oil and gas strata and removing the same therefrom." Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 867.
39 Id.
Smallwood I at 867.
"' Id.
42 Id. at 868.
43 Id.
- Id. at 867-68.
,5 Id. Unless precluded by the terms of a lease, the mineral owner would have the
exclusive right to explore for and produce gas released for storage as well as native gas.
A gas storage lease relinquishes that right and confers it on the lessee. Mere ownership
of the surface does not confer on the owner the right to explore for and produce native
gas merely because it is located beneath the surface which he owns. There being no
distinction as to ownership, he has no greater right with respect to the gas released for
underground storage. A lease from a mere surface owner confers no rights on the lessee
in connection with the production of gas, native or stored, because he has no rights to
confer. Id. at 868.
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half of the rental by virtue of his one-half interest in the mineral
estate.4 The importance of Smallwood I to this Comment is the
court's refusal to recognize a legal distinction between injected
and native gas, relying on Hammonds.47 The court relied on
Hammond's reasoning that ownership of an estate in land only
gives the right to explore and produce. 48 Ownership of an estate
in land is not equivalent with ownership of oil and gas; rather,
because of its fugacious nature, native or injected gas is only
owned when reduced to possession.
4 9
In Smallwood v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.5 0 [here-
inafter Smallwood I], the court distinguished between the stor-
age process, which involves injected gas, and the production
process which concerns native gas. 1 Smallwood II involved a
lease that remained effective for five years or "as long thereafter
as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by
the lessee." '5 2 The lessee argued that since stored gas was being
periodically injected and withdrawn from the reservoir, this con-
stituted "production," and the lease was still in force.13 The
lessor asserted that the leasehold was inoperative because native
gas had not been "produced" for several years.54 The court held
for the lessor, finding that the injection and withdrawal of gas
is distinct from production of native gas.55
In Smallwood II, the lessee relied upon Hammonds and
Smallwood I, arguing that under Kentucky case law there was
no distinction between native gas and stored gas.s However, the
Smallwood II court distinguished these cases by focusing on the
broader rights reserved in the leasehold of Smallwood J.57 Small-
wood I involved a leasehold that expressly provided for the




10 308 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1958).
" Id.
2 Id. at 441.
I3 d. at 442.
I d. at 441.
" Id. at 443. "The term 'produced' as used in the lease . does not mean 'stored'
in its plain meaning." Id.




storage and the injection of gas regardless of its source. 8 Small-
wood II's leasehold provided only for the "production" of oil
and gas.59 Since Smallwood II's lease narrowed the rights of the
leasehold, there was a necessity to distinguish between the stor-
age and the production of these mineral rights.
In Texas American Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank
& Trust Co. ,6 the court specifically overruled any language in
Hammonds, Smallwood I, or Smallwood II that indicated that
gas injected into a storage reservoir with confinement integrity
is not personalty. 61 What then is left of the landmark case of
Hammonds and the Smallwood opinions? Judge Thomas B.
Spain, author of the opinion adopted by the Kentucky Supreme
Court, noted that the fact situations in Hammonds and Texas
American are distinguishable. 62 He wrote:
Using the ferae naturae analogy, Western has captured the
wild fox, hence reducing it to personal property. The fox has
not been released in another forest, permitting it to revert to
the common property of mankind; but rather, the fox has only
been released in a private confinement zoo. The fox is no less
under the control of Western than if it were on a leash.
63
Hammonds involved a known leak in a gas storage reservoir;
the Texas American litigants stipulated that the storage reservoirs
had confinement integrity. 4
To a would-be injector of gas the question of whether con-
finement integrity exists is all-important because its presence or
absence will determine whether the injected gas is governed by
Texas American or Hammonds, respectively. What then is con-
finement integrity? In Texas American the Kentucky Supreme
Court cites in full the opinion of the trial court that often used
the phrase "confinement integrity" without explanation. 65 After
citing the lower court opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court
11 252 S.W.2d at 866.
19 308 S.W.2d at 441.
736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).




61 736 S.W.2d at 28.
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describes confinement integrity as being composed of two ele-
ments. 6 The first element is that the underground reservoir be
capable of being defined with certainty; secondly the integrity
of the reserviors must be maintainable. 67 The Kentucky Supreme
Court frames the issue in terms of the capacity of the injector
to control the gas. The author of this Comment believes that
capacity to confine can only be inferred from the injector's
actions to impede the escape of the gas. Any action evidencing
intent by the injector to confine the gas will result in the presence
of confinement integrity for the gas that remains in the reservoir.
Texas American does not require absolute confinement integrity
or even that a certain percentage of the gas be maintained.
68
Rather, any action of the injector to impede the escape of the
gas, no matter how insignificant, will evidence intent and thus
establish confinement integrity for the gas which remains in the
reservoir.
Theoretically, if gas leaked from a storage facility, the own-
ership rights over that escaped gas would continue to be gov-
erned by Hammonds and the mineral ferae naturae doctrine. In
such a fact situation, confinement integrity does not exist as to
that gas which has escaped and Texas American would not
apply. However, at least one court has held that once gas is
reduced to personal possession, the owner is not divested of
ownership simply because he stores the gas underground and it
migrates. 69
In his dissent, Justice Stephenson stated that nothing in the
Hammonds or Smallwood decisions is overruled because they
are so factually distinct. 70 Perhaps so, but these three cases
reflect a developing judicial recognition of the scientific ability
- "[11n those instances where previously extracted oil or gas is subsequently stored
in underground reservoirs capable of being defined with certainty and the integrity of
said reservoirs is capable of being maintained, title to such oil or gas is not lost and
such minerals do not become subject to the rights of the owners of the surface above
the storage fields." Id. at 28.
67 Id.
Id. at 25.
69 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Zuckerman, 189 Cal. App. 3d 451, 234 Cal. Rptr.
630 (1987). See generally Annotation, Gas-Storage in Natural Reservoirs, 94 A.L.R. 2d
543 (1964).
70 Texas America, 736 S.W.2d 25.
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to contain injected gas for consumer use. Hammonds and Small-
wood I, which did not distinguish between native gas and in-
jected gas, implicity held that both types of gas could not be
contained. 7' The Smallwood II court held that, for purposes of
a lease, injected gas and native gas differed. 72 Finally, the Texas
American court recognized that the presence of confinement
integrity dictates the type of ownership. 7
3
IV. JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY
Several states have addressed the issue of whether injected
gas is subject to the doctrine of mineral ferae naturae. Two
states, Texas and Pennsylvania, have rejected the wild animal
theory by court decision. 74 Whereas, Oklahoma and Kansas courts
have retained the doctrine. 75 Other states have adopted statutes
which provide that gas remains the property of the injector
unless the gas migrates from the contained area, at which point
it becomes subject to the law of capture. 76
In White v. New York State Natural Gas Corporation,77 a
Pennsylvania court rejected the mineral ferae naturae concept,
holding that application of the theory was limited to the original
capture of native oil and gas. 71 In White, the court opined that
injected gas differed materially in chemical and physical prop-
erties from native gas and could be readily identified for own-
ership purposes. 79 The court noted that the development and use
of underground storage facilities was in the public interest.80
Hammonds, 75 S.W.2d at 204; Smallwood I, 252 S.W.2d at 867-68.
Smallwood 11, 308 S.W.2d at 442.
73 736 S.W.2d at 28.
', White v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960)
and Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
7 See Bezzi v. Hocker, 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966); Anderson v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985).
'6 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 393.500 (Vernon 1985 Supp.) (Missouri); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 52 § 36.6 (West 1969) (Oklahoma); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-6-8 (1978) (New
Mexico).
190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
7I Id. at 346.
79 Id.
I White, 190 F. Supp. at 349.
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In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison,"' the Texas courts
adopted White, rejecting the mineral ferae naturae theory. Re-
lying on the new scientific ability to move gas by pressure or
other mechanical means, the court dismissed the analogy between
gas and wild animals, and stated that: "Gas has no similarity
to wild animals. Gas is an inanimate, diminishing nonreproduc-
tive substance lacking any will of its own." 2 Since extracted gas
becomes personalty, the court reasoned that generally the only
process by which personalty can be lost is abandonment.83 Be-
cause the gas company in Lone Star did not intend to abandon
its property, title to the personalty was retained.
In Texas American, the Texas American Energy Corporation
argued that the Texas court in Lone Star and the Pennsylvania
court in White had correctly rejected the mineral ferae naturae
doctrine.84 Citizens Fidelity countered that these two states had
adopted the ownership in place or corporeal rule, and, therefore,
Lone Star and White were not on point.85 Generally, though not
uniformly, the Kentucky courts have adopted the non-ownership
or incorporeal rule.8 6 The corporeal rule and the mineral ferae
naturae doctrine state the same premise-there is no ownership
of oil and gas until the mineral is reduced to possession. 87 But,
the incorporeal rule clearly states that, before the minerals are
removed from the land, ownership of oil and gas is an interest
in real estate. 8
Perhaps recognizing the distinction, the Texas American court
did not discuss Kentucky's incorporeal rule.8 9 Classifying an
interest as corporeal is distinct from classifying oil or gas inter-
ests as realty or personalty.9 A corporeal or incorporeal interest
is based on its possessory nature. 9' The common law distinction
' 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
82 Id. at 879.
83 Id.
" Brief for Texas American Energy Corporation at 10, Texas American, 736
S.W.2d 25.
" Appellant's Brief at 11, Texas American, 736 S.W.2d 25.
Ia 1 WtLLMS & MEYERS, OM. AND GAS LAW, 36 (1985).
87 B. HEMINGWAY, supra note 2, at § 1.3.
88 Id.
736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
o See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
9 WILLLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 86, at 131.
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between real estate and personalty is based on whether the thing
possessed was moveable. 92 Land and objects that are securely
attached to the earth are immobile; all other objects that are
moveable are personalty. 93 Application of the incorporeal rule
to the realty and personalty distinction is unnecessary, but a
survey of the case law will reveal that courts often try to correlate
the two distinct classifications. 94
In recent court decisions, two states have ruled to retain the
doctrine. In Bezzi v. Hocker,9 a federal circuit court relying on
Oklahoma law acknowledged that oil and gas are mobile and
fugacious and if possession is lost, title is also lost. The trial
court relied on Oklahoma precedent, finding that title to injected
gas was lost because of its fugacious nature and that once lost,
gas becomes subject to the law of capture. 96 The court stated
that whatever title the mineral owner had prior to the date his
interest terminated, title was lost when the gas was injected into
a common source of supply with the subsequent commingling
of native and injected gas.
97
The Kansas courts also retained the ferae naturae rule. In
Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corporation," the court held that
when the gas company, which was not a public utility, attempted
to create an underground storage reservoir under the property
of an adjoining landowner without the contractual right to do
so, the law of capture was applicable to that injected gas. 99 The
court stated: "We thus hold that Beech Aircraft lost its owner-
ship of the stored gas after injecting it into the reservoir in this
case."' ° The gas company had contended that it had the right
to store gas under the land of an adjoining landowner without
obtaining a permit, license, condemnation right, or without pay-
92 R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK, & D. WmxrAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.4
(1st ed. 1984).
93 Id.
9 See generally BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE (MB) 16.15
(1966).
- 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966).
% Id. at 535.
9 Id.
" 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985).
" Id. at 1031.
'1w Id.
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ing rentals or compensation."0 The Anderson court found that
such a rule would result in extensive litigation between the pro-
ducer of the injected gas and the owner of the adjoining estate
who owns rights to the native gas. 0 2 Both of the cases, Bezzi
and Anderson, have an element of bad faith or mistake, either
by commingling or by injection without a contractual right. 03
They are factually distinct from Texas American which involved
a public utility possessing control of an entire underground
storage facility with confinement integrity. 1 4
V. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S APPLICATION TO
INJECTED GAS
The Texas American court concluded that injected gas is
personalty and a "good" under the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter U.C.C. or the "Code"]. 0 5 Therefore, the U.C.C.
controls the proper method of perfecting a security interest in
oil and gas after extraction. Texas American did not discuss the
pertinent provisions of the U.C.C. relative to filing a security
agreement for injected gas."° However, an analysis of Kentuck-
y's version of the U.C.C. reveals that the Texas American hold-
ing is consistent with the drafter's intent that the U.C.C. apply
to security agreements covering oil and gas.
The U.C.C. definition of goods requires that they be existing
and moveable.107 Therefore, the U.C.C. does not pertain to gas
or oil until they are extracted from the land. 08 Prior to extraction
a security interest in oil and gas is an interest in real estate. 19
The U.C.C. applies to sales or security transactions in
goods." 0 In order to qualify as goods under the Code, the
101 Id.
102 Id.
Id. and 370 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1966).
736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
,01 Texas American Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d
25, 28 (Ky. 1987).
1o Texas American, 736 S.W.2d at 28.
,- KRS §§ 355.2-103, .2-106 (1958).
-- KRS § 355.9-105(1)(h) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (effective July 1, 1987). See
generally Weinberg, Graham and Stipanowich, Modernizing Kentucky's Uniform Com-
merical Code, 73 Ky. L.J. 515, at 570-71 (1985).
109 Id.
1- KRS § 355.2-102 (1958).
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product must be existing and moveable at the time of identifi-
cation to the contract for sale."' Therefore, prior to severance,
oil and gas are realty and are not governed by the U.C.C. After
severance, during the transportation and storage process, the oil
and gas are goods. The pertinent Code section provides " 'goods'
includes all things which are moveable at the time the security
interest attaches . . . but does not include . . . minerals or the
like (including oil and gas) before extraction. ' " t2 When oil and
gas are taken from their original reservoir, they are measured
and transported by pipeline. Since they can be transported and
measured, oil and gas are existing and moveable; therefore, they
are within the U.C.C. definition of goods." 3
Under the U.C.C. in effect at the filing of the Texas Amer-
ican action, a financing statement covering minerals did not
require a description of the land where the minerals were lo-
cated." 4 Subsequently, Kentucky has adopted amendments to
the U.C.C. which provide for the filing of a financing statement
covering oil and gas in the same office where the real estate
records are filed.' Additionally, the financing statement must
contain a description of the land where the minerals are lo-
cated. 1 6 If the debtor does not have an interest of record in the
real estate, the financing statement must show the name of a
record owner." 7 Thus the drafters of the U.C.C. have attempted
to give protection to subsequent lenders by identifying the land
where the minerals are located to prevent an over indebtedness
on the part of the debtor. Since searching the real estate records
will put subsequent lenders on notice, applying the U.C.C. will
not lessen the reliability of oil and gas security interests, as
compared to the filing of a mortgage.
In Northern Trust Co. v. Buckeye Petroleum Co.,'8 a North
Dakota court found that upon default of a security interest
KRS §§ 355.2-103, .2-105 (1958).
KRS § 355.9-105(1)(h) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (effective July 1, 1987).
113 Id. at §§ 355.2-103, .2-105 (1958).
11 Id. at § 355.9-402(4) (1986).
" Id. at § 355.9-402(5) (1988) (effective July 1, 1987).
16 Id.
11 KRS § 355.9-402(4) (1986).
389 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1986). The court opined that section 9-104 of the U.C.C.
demonstrated a statutory intent that the U.C.C. governs oil and gas interests since they
were not expressly excluded. Id. at 620.
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covering real property, oil, and gas, a secured party had the
rights and remedies provided in Article 9 of the U.C.C. in
addition to those provided in the security agreement." 9 The
creditor had executed an open-ended mortgage, security agree-
ment, and financing statement covering the debtor's interest in
oil, gas, and real property. 2 0 The open-ended mortgage was
recorded in the real estate records and filed as a security agree-
ment and financing statement.' 21 The court found that the col-
lateral involved was both real and personal property, concluding
that oil and gas, once extracted, are personal property because
the U.C.C. does not expressly exclude them.
22
Because the U.C.C. clearly delineates what it does not apply
to, it is reasonable to conclude that the absence of oil and gas
from this section reflects the drafters' intent that Article 9 of
the U.C.C. apply to injected oil and gas. 23 Texas American has
done away with the previous uncertainty the oil and gas industry
experienced concerning how to perfect a security interest in
injected gas. 24 Texas American affirms that the U.C.C. offers
greater uniformity and reliability to the industry. 1'
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the U.C.C. was not only to make uniform
the laws among the various jurisdictions, "but [also] to discard
distinctions between different types of transactions where those
distinctions have only historical justification."'' 26 Before the ad-
vent of injected gas, a security interest in these minerals was
"9 Id. at 616.
Im Id. at 617.
Id.
IZ Id. at 620.
,2, See generally KRS § 355.9-104 (1986) (effective July 1, 1987).
'1' Texas American, 736 S.W.2d at 28.
125 Id.
126 KRS § 355.1-102 (1966). Section 355.1-102 provides:
(1) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are: a) to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; b) to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties; c) to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions. Id.; see also, BENDER'S COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE
(MB) 1 16.14 (1966).
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justifiably analogized to a security interest in real property. 127
However, as the scientific ability to confine and transport oil
and gas advanced, Kentucky needed to re-examine the doctrine
of mineral ferae naturae. The Texas American Energy Corp. v.
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. 128 decision recognizes that
the mineral ferae naturae doctrine is inappropriate to the injec-
tion of gas into a storage reservoir with confinement integrity. 1
29
Gas and oil can be measured, confined, and transported and,
thus, qualify as "goods" under the U.C.C.13° Since virtually
every state has adopted Article Nine of the U.C.C., its appli-
cability will lubricate multi-state transactions. 3' The U.C.C. of-
fers uniformity among jurisdictions in the creation of a security
interest in injected oil and gas. Therefore, it also offers greater
reliability for creditors. Rejection of the archaic mineral ferae
naturae doctrine as applied to the injection of gas into a storage
reservoir with confinement integrity is founded on commercial
reasonableness and acknowledgement of the scientific advances
in the area.
PAMELA C. BRATCHER
27 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
23 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
'2' See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
30 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
... WHrTE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE I (2d ed.
1980). As of 1980, the U.C.C. has been adopted in all states but Louisiana.
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